Greg McKeown:
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Saad Mohseni was born in London to Afghan parents in 1966. He lived in Japan, Australia, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan before returning to Kabul in 2002 after the US invasion. He’s the co-founder, chairman, and executive officer of Mobi Group, which—get this—is Afghanistan’s largest media company. I mean, if that doesn’t create a whole vision of an unusual journey filled and fraught with challenges, I don’t know what else does. He’s brought top-tier news and media content to emerging markets for the last two decades. He was named an Asia Game Changer by the Asian Society and, in a rare acknowledgment, was named one of Time magazine’s 100 most influential people in the world.
Mohseni serves on the board of the International Crisis Group and is a member of the International Advisory Council for the Middle East Institute. He lives in London and Dubai, recently wrote a Washington Post op-ed, and is the author of Radio Free Afghanistan: A 20-Year Odyssey for an Independent Voice in Kabul.
So, Saad, welcome to the podcast.
Saad Mohseni:
Thank you, Greg. Good to be on.
Greg McKeown:
Can you just tell us your story from the beginning in a shortened version for anyone who isn’t familiar with this remarkable journey that you’ve been on?
Saad Mohseni:
I was the son of an Afghan diplomat, born in London. My father served in the US and in the UK, Japan, Pakistan, and we were actually in Japan when the Soviets invaded, and we could not go back to Afghanistan. And then we immigrated to Australia. But for us, we never accepted the fact that we would become permanent residents of Australia. We always felt that we needed to go back if the opportunity came up.
So, after 9/11, we visited Afghanistan in early 2002. And you know, quite by accident, we set up this small radio station. It was really a passive investment, but it was so controversial it sort of dragged us in kicking and screaming, and the next thing we knew, we were running a, you know, small media operation. And then that we expand, you know, we obviously—as one does—you expand your business, and a radio station became a national radio network, and we set up our first television station, a second television station, a third television station, another radio network, and then we went outside. We set up a pan-Persian TV network, we set up an Urdu network in Pakistan, we set up an African business out of Ethiopia, and India, and the Middle East as well. But of course, Afghanistan it is our home country. It’s always been very important to us. We continue to remain in the country; we have 500 employees, we produce a lot of content, and I wrote this book.
Basically, I assumed in 2021 that it’s the end of us, and I wanted to—I thought it would be cathartic to write this book. It was just a flash, and it was gone, and I assumed that it would end soon. But we’re still there, for now, at least. That’s like the sort of Reader’s Digest condensed version for you.
Greg McKeown:
Let’s get to that pivotal point where you decided, “Well, I’m going to write this because it’s all over now. The Taliban is now fully back in charge of Afghanistan, and you had set up the radio station originally in 2002.” I assume that was related to the invasion of Afghanistan—please correct me—and so there had been a degree of increased freedom, and so you just assumed, “Well, that’s now, that’s going to be over immediately.” Am I getting this right so far? What did I get wrong?
Saad Mohseni:
No, you’re right, absolutely. I mean, in this new post-9/11/ US invasion environment, we ended up with a constitution that enshrined freedom of expression free media, a completely new environment to the one that Afghans experienced during the Taliban days. But even during the communist time, you couldn’t, you know—although it seemed liberal in terms of women’s rights and so forth—but media was not allowed to operate. Free media was not allowed to operate. It was a domain of the state. So we had this opportunity to set up, and which we did. But then, when the Taliban, this ideologically driven movement that did not believe in democracy, that did not—what we felt then—did not believe in freedom of expression, were back in charge, we assumed that it was just a matter of time before they shut us down.
Greg McKeown:
So that, of course, is an assumption. Well, it’s an assumption I would have held, and I’m sure it’s the assumption that many people listening to this would hold. So help us to understand what has actually happened. The business is still alive for now, but what has it been like? What is your experience?
Saad Mohseni:
It’s been very difficult. You know, people say, “Well, you know.” They ask me how do you describe your business? I always describe this business we have today as a startup that has never stopped being a startup. All the challenges a new business faces, it’s like Groundhog Day, every single day, it’s like it just never ends. So for the last three years, it’s been like that, that every single day I wake up to tens of messages, and there’s always a concern of, you know, they’re going to shut us down, or they’re going to make it so restrictive for us that it would be ridiculous to carry on.
So, three years on, what does it look like? So, we have a business that continues to operate. All our networks operate, but we cannot have music, and we cannot have soap operas. And women who appear on television have to cover themselves, cover their faces. They wear surgical masks; they don’t actually put on the veil, but nonetheless, they cover a big portion of their faces.
But on the flip side, we’re continuing to entertain, we’re continuing to inform. Most important of all, we’re continuing to educate. Because what we’ve done? We’ve launched these series of education programs for grades seven, eight, and nine in four subjects—chemistry, physics, and mathematics—and it’s been an extraordinary success. And at the same time, our presence on the ground allows the world also to find out what’s going on inside the country.
You know, this is not 2004, where there were hundreds of foreign journalists in Afghanistan. Today, we’re almost the only game in town. So it’s an important role. We have a lot of women working for us still. As a matter of fact, our news team has more than doubled the number of women employees, as producers, as presenters, as journalists, as researchers, in front of the camera, and behind the camera, and we continue to employ 450, 500 people. So we’re still there. But in this environment, we can’t take anything for granted, and I always add—for now.
Greg McKeown:
And when you say it’s like Groundhog Day, can you just give us an insight into a day in the life? Like when you say you wake up with 15 messages, 20 messages—saying what? By who?
Saad Mohseni:
Well, I mean, obviously, we’re continuing to engage with our people on the ground. You know, we have a government relations team, we have a news team, we have the entertainment guys, we have producers, and, of course, we have the senior management, and because every decision they have to make can impact us in such a significant way, they have to consult with us. This is not like five, six years ago, where we would task a particular manager and—
Greg McKeown:
Give a lot of freedom to them, right?
Saad Mohseni:
So now they have to come back to us because they realize a decision could cost us our license, or it could result in someone getting arrested, perhaps someone getting killed. So, I don’t think anyone wants to take that responsibility, so they have to come back to us, as the principals, to help them make those decisions. And it’s difficult, but it means that we’re fully engaged in the business again—that we’re involved in all the key decisions. And there’s trouble on a daily basis in relation to it.
Well, in relation to a particular story or, interviewing someone, or tackling a particular issue from a specific angle,
Greg McKeown:
Can you give us an example of like a news story that they’re wanting to pursue but they’re not sure if it’s going to be too controversial? What would fall under that category?
Saad Mohseni:
For example, the Human Rights Commission—the UN Human Rights Commission—puts out a statement about the treatment of women or minorities in Afghanistan, and the way we cover that story. We have to cover that story. There is no story that we cannot cover because otherwise, we lose our credibility. And the way we would cover that story—do we cover it, you know, just a brief news story? Do we bring in guests to discuss it? Do we have a town hall-type meeting? How far do we grill the authorities in terms of this report and what they’re doing about it? So, a simple story all of a sudden becomes not so simple, and people have to make decisions. And it’s about timing. You know, you can’t sit on this story for four days. It’s been out, you need to report on it. So, every decision has, you know… and if I’m in New York and the time difference is significant, I have to wake up and deal with it immediately. Or if I’m in London, obviously, I have a few more hours, but it’s difficult for us, but it’s even more difficult for the folks on the ground. They’re the individuals that eventually will have to pay a price if there’s a price to be paid. I mean, we would lose our license and we would lose our business, but some poor kid working as a producer or, you know, as a manager, he could be locked up for it—it could cost him his life, potentially. So these are very important decisions. We have to think a lot of things through and very quickly.
Greg McKeown:
It’s inherent dilemmas—all while trying to do the usual job, which is not an easy job, of a journalist, to work out, “Well, what is the news? What is the real story here? And how do I share it?” That’s already an interesting challenge in a complex world. But then, in addition, there are these other layers of uncertainty—and I think it’s more than just uncertainty. It sounds like fear.
I wonder if you can speak to this for a moment. How explicit has the Taliban been with you about what you’re allowed to do and what you aren’t allowed to do? Is it written somewhere? Is it explicit like that, or is it ambiguous in a way that in some ways might be useful, but it also means that anything could be questioned and challenged? How clear is the communication?
Saad Mohseni:
What is usually issued in writing, like an edict from the leader, is obviously very explicit; it’s very black and white. But when it comes to implementation, they can be very vague. For example, the Ministry of Vice and Virtue issued like a 15-page list of can’s and cannot’s. But then we met with the government, with the Ministry of Vice and Virtue, with the Ministry of Information and Culture, and we were advised, “No, you can continue as before, and there’s no need, for example, to get rid of women on your TV programs, there’s no need to silence their voices.” So, you know, obviously, there’s a verbal understanding, a verbal interpretation of very explicit rules. So, we think, “Well, we can continue.” But then, in a week, maybe some other member of the government will come and say, “Why aren’t you abiding by these decrees or edicts, which are very clear, and you’re not abiding by them?” So, there’s a great deal of confusion.
The situation, as always, is very nuanced on the ground, even with the Taliban. It’s not a monolithic movement. You have different factions or groups, but you have people who are pragmatic, and there are people who are very hardcore and conservative. And within the movement itself, there’s this tug of war between these different forces, and we’re not quite sure who’s going to prevail ultimately, and we could potentially become collateral damage, or we could be used by either side in terms of how they want to impose their version of Islam, or an Islamic state or a Sharia state, in a country of 42 million people. So, I don’t know what the future holds, but for now, it’s a one day at a time for us.
Greg McKeown:
I’ve seen very little coverage on Afghanistan since the removal of US forces, which itself, although it was covered broadly and was front-page news, it didn’t seem to last very long here, which was pretty shocking for me—that it wasn’t a story that continued for, I don’t know, weeks, months. I mean, it was a huge moment, of course, for Afghanistan and also for the United States, for its position in the world and so on, its reliability, all sorts of things that grow out of that decision. What was your sense of that?
Saad Mohseni:
Well, first and foremost, I think it was America’s longest war. It had to end, and it was not popular. It wasn’t unpopular like Vietnam, for example, but it wasn’t popular either. And obviously, you know, when you spend a trillion dollars and people start asking the very simple question, “How does this benefit the United States?”
Greg McKeown:
And what does winning or an end state look like? You know, what would the withdrawal circumstances be? I mean, these are, of course, legitimate questions. Go ahead.
Saad Mohseni:
I don’t question the decision to leave. I thought we were quite lucky in some ways that the world remained interested and engaged in Afghanistan for two decades, but we knew it had to come to an end because—whether it was Trump, and you know, I’ve written this in my book, my dealings with folks like Steve Bannon, early on, and other Trump officials they, you know, we had a moment, we had a couple of years, we had a reprieve of sorts when some of the old establishment figures like Secretary Mathis and H.R. McMaster and others who were in key positions—they convinced Trump, “Let’s keep this going. We can reduce the number of troops, but we can maintain things as they are.” But it was inevitable that Trump’s instinct was to get out, and foreign adventures—I mean, he was always very open about this—foreign adventures, we should focus on domestic issues. And it made sense, and most Americans agreed with that. So I thought—we always felt—it was inevitable that the Americans would eventually draw down. But the manner in which they left Afghanistan, the manner they executed the Doha Agreement, which was an agreement signed with the Taliban, I think that’s the thing that was painful to watch. And the unraveling of the state that they had spent so much money on, and you know, we had all sacrificed, including Americans, Brits, and Europeans, but to abandon this… You know, I could argue it was a flourishing country. The population had doubled from 2001 to 2021. In two decades, the population had doubled. It’s still a very young country—actually the youngest country outside of sub-Saharan Africa, with a median age of like 18. Vastly urbanized. Over this period, from a handful of students to 10 million students over a two-decade period, huge gains in terms of life expectancy, drops in child mortality, blah, blah, blah, you know. And a lot of development thanks to mostly international money.
Looking back, they should have conducted this withdrawal in a more responsible manner, which they did not. The clumsy withdrawal—people falling out of aircraft, two weeks moving a couple hundred thousand people out via Kabul airport—was painful to watch. I joked that if the White House could expunge Afghanistan from the dictionary, they would. No one wanted to talk about Afghanistan. Even now, this White House has been scarred by that withdrawal. But what about the Afghans? You know, I think for the Americans it’s been, you know, a loss of prestige, perhaps bruising for the ego, but for the Afghans the pain is real. And then, of course, complete disengagement. You know, it’s a sanctioned country because of the Taliban sanctions, which were sort of grandfathered in because the Taliban had been sanctioned since, you know, the late 90s, and individual sanctions in the early years of the American occupation, that people to continue to litigate against the Taliban.
You’re also targeting the population which is suffering. Half the population doesn’t have food security. A third of the population doesn’t have access to housing that’s insulated. We’re at the mercy of what the weather’s like next season. If you look at it, we have three and a half million kids who don’t get a proper meal. They’re malnourished. I mean, 70% of the population doesn’t have access to clean water.
But because they’re not dealing with the government, they’re unable to help because they cannot work through the government clinics, they cannot work through the ministries, so it’s left to the UN, which is not particularly competent, perhaps corrupt—the World Food Program and others—and there’s probably a lot of wastage. You know, I mean, the cost of aid is anywhere from 15 to 50%, depending on what sort of aid it is. So it’s extraordinary. But the people are suffering. I joke that the Taliban are not suffering. Every one of the key ministers has put on weight. The Taliban, and they haven’t really given the Western powers what they were after. The reality is that they’re going to probably remain in power, at least for now. There’s a need to reassess in terms of conducting business in Afghanistan. It’s important that the West had this relationship with Afghanistan for two decades. People served in Afghanistan, they visited Afghanistan, and this attempt at nation-building may have failed in some ways, but it was also very effective. It was consequential for the Afghan population. It changed an entire generation of Afghans.
Greg McKeown:
When you first began answering that question, there was almost a sense within you of, “This was breathtaking, the way it was done.” Like, “Why is it being done like this?” You used the word “more responsibly,” but what I sense—and I’m not trying to put words in your mouth—but it’s like, “Could this have been done more irresponsibly?” How is the financial investment—this trillion dollars—how was the explicit and implicit pact with the people of Afghanistan? Okay, now we will not talk about it. We will not, you know, we’re not going to address it publicly or even privately. First of all, did I get that right because I don’t want to put words in your mouth? And then I have a question. Go ahead.
Saad Mohseni:
Absolutely. But it was an accident in slow motion. We observed all the mistakes along the way. You know, the Afghan military was built in the mold of the US military, reliant on contractors. So all these contractors are on the ground helping the US military, but they’re also helping the Afghan military. Biden announces in mid-April he’s leaving. Within two weeks, the contractors have left Kabul and moved to places like Abu Dhabi and so forth, the UAE, Qatar, and other places.
Now, all of a sudden, the Afghan military—reliant on these contractors—is not able to fix its aircraft or service its aircraft, it’s not able to fix its trucks, it can’t give fuel to the provinces, and it is completely paralyzed and cannot function. And, you know, they have this peace deal with the Taliban, excluding the Afghan government or at least excluding other Afghans. They could have included civil society and so forth. They execute this deal. They announce they’re going to leave, and they leave within four months. But in the meantime they do nothing to help the transition on the transition side. One of the things I remember going to Washington and meeting folks in the White House and other places and sayig, “Well, listen, you guys need to at least meet at the deputy principal’s level twice a week to manage this transition from international, US, back to the Afghan side and figure out what you can do to create a mechanism through which, even if the Taliban were to come and prevail, that they come through a coalition of sorts.” And it was very obvious that this was going to end in disaster, but no one would listen.
Greg McKeown:
What does that mean, “No one would listen?” I mean, of course, I understand the general meaning, but were you reaching out yourself to specific people—you don’t have to name them—but specific people and saying, “Okay, we see this slow-motion train wreck happening. This is what I’m urgently suggesting you do about this”?
Saad Mohseni:
Absolutely. I mean, it was with key American government officials, in the White House, with key development foreign policy individuals. And I remember in July, I was in Washington, and I mentioned it to someone who’d seen it—it’s in my book—this government could collapse by November. And I remember one person’s reaction was, “Oh my God, you’re being an alarmist.” And, of course, it collapsed.
They had no idea.
Greg McKeown:
Really?
Saad Mohseni:
Yeah, I mean, this lack of understanding of a country you’d spent a trillion dollars in is just extraordinary. They didn’t have the intelligence, they didn’t see—I mean, I told a senior US military official many years before, I said, “Listen, the Taliban when they prevail, they probably, you know, there’s no need for them to fight because in Afghanistan, people have survived the last 40, 50 years because they can see the winds of change.” It’s a simple case of lowering one flag and raising another flag. And that’s exactly what happened.
When the Americans signaled that they were going to leave and they were going to leave in four months, people started to switch sides. You know, government officials joined the Taliban. They lowered one flag and raised another flag. But my conclusion is that they didn’t care. It wasn’t like they wanted to get out, and they wanted to get out quickly. It’s cut your losses and get out. And what happens to the Afghans? It’s not our problem. As a matter of fact, you recall there was an interview that Joe Biden gave while he was campaigning, and he was adamant that, “Listen, we don’t care about Afghan women.” I mean, he specifically said, “We don’t care about Afghan women.” So, anyway, it was just a very harsh, heartless way of leaving and abandoning a nation. You know, abandoning a government is one thing, abandoning a nation is another thing. But some of the gains can still be sustained, and that’s why engagement is important.
Greg McKeown:
For everybody listening, what is one thing that stood out to you? You know, what’s a key thought that has penetrated your mind, your heart? Maybe it was something Saad said, maybe it was not something that we’ve even talked about, but you have felt it. What is one thing you can do immediately, differently, because of it that’s in your sphere of influence, and who is somebody you can share this conversation with? Now that this conversation has come to an end, thank you. Thank you for listening.
