Greg McKeown:
Welcome. I’m your host, Greg McKeown, and I am here with you on a journey to learn so that we can make a higher contribution.
Do you feel psychologically safer at work now than you did several years ago? It’s an interesting question, and today I’ve invited perhaps the preeminent expert in the world on the subject of psychological safety to discuss that and other things with us. This is Dr. Amy Edmondson, a professor at Harvard, and the person most responsible for making the term psychological safety ubiquitous in the world after she published a paper more than 20 years ago focused on this subject.
This is part one of two parts to our conversation. I knew it was going to be a good conversation because Amy is as capable as they come, and the subject is so timely. But even with that, the conversation went further and deeper, more real, more raw than I expected it would.
By the end of this episode, you will have new insight as to what psychological safety actually is and what it isn’t, and where the threats are coming from to that psychological safety in today’s workplace. Let’s begin.
And if you want to get more out of these episodes, learn faster, and go more deeply, sign up for the One Minute Wednesday newsletter. You just go to gregmckeown.com, and it’s in the top right-hand corner. It’s completely free to everyone. It’s a resource that will help you in all of these ways.
Amy Edmondson, welcome to the podcast.
Amy Edmondson:
Thank you. Thanks for having me.
Greg McKeown:
20 years ago, if you can believe it, more than 20 years ago, you defined this term psychological safety, and one of the definitions you have identified is its permission for candor. Can you unpack that definition and just how else you think of this essential idea?
Amy Edmondson:
Absolutely. So think about children. They’re very direct, right? They will say anything. I mean, little children, you know, certainly preschool, preformal schooling. They’ll say anything that comes into their head. They’ll ask questions. They’ll point out the spinach on your teeth, whatever, right? They’ll do it; they’ll do it all. But one of the things we learn how to do starting in elementary school, and certainly by the time we are working adults, it’s all but second nature is to hold back, right? To wait and see, to say the things you’re pretty confident will be, will earn you approval, and to stay away from the things that you believe might earn you disapproval, rejection, humiliation, or worse, right? So that’s what education and socialization, it’s one of the things that education and socialization are good at. Reinforcing a kind of habitual response to weight and see, to hold back.
Greg McKeown:
To look around, see what other people are doing.
Amy Edmondson:
Yeah. See, you know, and especially see what the so-called important people are doing. You know, what is the boss think? What do the cool kids think? Right? So that you can kind of then alter your response. Now, I am not saying this is bad, good, immoral, or anything else. I’m just saying it’s true, right? It’s descriptively true.
And so then you say, okay, so what? Right? Well, the fact is this habit will not harm your next dinner party, right? It will, you will have a perfectly enjoyable, lively conversation around the dinner table, and this pattern may harm your work team’s performance, right? Because people, so this sense of permission for candor is, is just largely, it’s not a given, right? Again, because of the overlearning of these habitual norms that we do in school and beyond. So if that’s not a given, but your team depends on sort of wild ideas to innovate, or your team depends on people’s willingness to speak up quickly about a signal that something might be off to prevent failures downstream, or, you know, something on tour is going on and no one’s speaking up about it, right? All of those things will come back to haunt you, right? So if you really care about your team being high performing, agile, innovative, whatever the primary sort of aspiration you have for your team, then you need to worry about felt permission for candor.
Greg McKeown:
So how did you select this particular challenge in the first place?
Amy Edmondson:
Well, I should probably say I didn’t select it; it selected me. But I think probably a better answer is that I was passionately interested in learning. I don’t mean sort of individual learning at school, but
Greg McKeown:
Organizational learning.
Amy Edmondson:
Right. The whole idea of organizational learning caught my attention in a big way in the late eighties. I just met Chris Argyris and Peter Senge through some sort of corporate work I was involved with, and they came along and like,
Greg McKeown:
And The Fifth Discipline, the work that they were doing, was
Amy Edmondson:
Not out yet. It was not out yet
Greg McKeown:
Before that, you were influenced directly by their thinking. And Senge’s thinking. Was that what sparked it for you, then?
Amy Edmondson:
Well, that’s what got me interested, you know, in this sort of abstract idea that organizations need to learn to succeed in a changing world, right? They need to innovate, they need adjust, they need to do continuous improvement. The more I studied organizations, and this was sort of from the perspective of a consulting company, the more I saw barriers to learning rather than enablers, right? There’s just a lot of barriers, right?
And okay, so now let’s fast forward, but I still had this sort of perplexing, nagging worry in my head that organizations don’t learn. It’s too abstract to even say, does that organization learn? Let’s say, you know, general Motors at and t, right? What is, what is that? It’s just an enormous thing. It’s an enormous thing with multiple locations and thousands or hundreds of thousands of people.
And so this is a long-winded way of saying it occurred to me that teams are where the learning is, right? Because individuals, I already knew that the individuals in those organizations were very smart and capable, and they saw the sort of competitive dynamic, you know, they were, they were as aware as I was of the shortcomings of the product services processes their companies had. But as individuals, even fairly high-level individuals, they couldn’t change it, right? They lacked a magic wand that sort of poof, you know, change the organization. And that’s in part, again, because organizations are big and messy and complex, and there’s no their there, right?
So then I thought, okay, you know, the real learning, the way organizations learn this is a blinding flash of the obvious is their teams learn, right? And because that’s where the work is, it’s not individuals.
Greg McKeown:
If they learn, the teams learn. Because, of course, as you’re suggesting, you can have intelligent individuals and unintelligent teams, and that seems to be the gist of what you’re directing at.
Amy Edmondson:
Yeah. I mean, well, you can have, yeah, you can have intelligent individuals who’ve sized things up but don’t have a way to enact change, but their teams could. And then if you think about teams, well, there’s, what does that mean? Well, that means the top management team is a team, A new product development team is a team, a factory production team is a team. And they all have very different jobs, but they all must learn, they all must learn if the company is going to thrive into the future.
Greg McKeown:
Well, what you’re saying is you got attracted to that particular unit within the larger organization that called to you and said, that’s the group that if they can learn, then they can make important change within the wider organization. Go ahead.
Amy Edmondson:
That’s exactly right. So that became the thing I thought I’d look at, right? Because, and anyway, it was not inconsistent with what both Chris Argyris and Peter Senge were doing and saying. It’s sort of like even Peter has a chapter in the book on team learning, right? So let’s, okay, I want to look at team learning now. Team learning, by in large, and it really hardly matters what job you have, happens through conversation. I mean action also, but very much the quality of the conversation will point us, right, to the quality of the learning. And, so then,
Greg McKeown:
In a sense, conversation is the learning, right? Like that’s the, that’s where it’s happening,
Amy Edmondson:
That’s where it’s happening. But sometimes it’s not, you know.
And almost more often, it’s not, right? What is actually happening while it’s posturing or, you know, habitual routines or what Chris Argyris called defensive routines, which are explicitly non-learning conversations. I mean, not; they’re not deliberately non-learning. They’re just explicitly not learning.
Greg McKeown:
I don’t want to take us off track, but I want to go deep on that for a second. What does it look like? What is the primary observable team behavior look like when they’re not learning in your experience?
Amy Edmondson:
The primary one, that’s a great question, is the ratio of advocacy to inquiry is too high. Yeah. Often even 100% meaning if you analyze the conversation, you transcribe it, analyze it, you will see statement after statement and very little genuine questions. You might see the leading question. You might occasionally see a yes, no question whether the obvious answer was yes or no, but you don’t see that sort of genuine question that is focused on some issue at hand is, like genuinely hoping to have my mind changed about something or to have my understanding deepened about something.
Greg McKeown:
Okay. Can I push on this for a second? More so advocacy to inquiry. I totally understand what you’re describing now. When you say you have the transcript, you analyze it, codify it.
What does that look like? Is it everybody in the room is advocating? Or is it that one or two voices are louder, and they’re advocating, and the rest are silent? What’s the dynamic you’ve observed?
Amy Edmondson:
It’s a, it’s a great question, and I wish I could give you an actual empirical answer, but I can give you a rough sense that all of those dynamics are possible. The most common one is that you’re hearing more talking, I’ll just put it in quotes, “the boss”, the, you know, whoever’s the highest ranking person in the room is often guilty, not because they’re, you know, again, often unaware, but often guilty of doing most of the talking. And from a purely scientific perspective, it’s arguable that they’re doing too much of the talking because they’re furthest from the actual, you know, customer dynamics or technologies or what have you. Right? So they should be doing talking, but they should also be doing a great deal more than they often do of listening.
So one common sort of, you know, advocacy orientation is that it’s too much talking by a person in a position of power, not enough inquiry, anyone, however, because, in theory, anyone could disrupt it. And, and so that’s sort of the number one because it’s like you can’t learn if you’re not curious and you’re not expressing curiosity and then actively trying to bring in stuff that might, you know, disconfirm a prior or, or might at least deepen your understanding at the very least of what of why you’re right.
Greg McKeown:
I sometimes joke with audiences when I’m working with them and will say, look, has anyone been to a meeting where the real meeting happened after the meeting had passed? And everyone says yes, you know, hands up as you said, as you’re signaling. But somebody once sort of pushed back, not against that, but they said, who has been at a meeting where the real meeting happened before the meeting began. And that’s another similar dynamic, I think, the one you’re describing. If you come into the meeting and the manager’s already made the decision, and now this is a pretense, well, what do you all think about it? But you can sense that it’s already decided. There’s no conversation here. It’s another, seems to me, another element of this efficacy.
Amy Edmondson:
And I call that the sham meeting or the sham decision-making meeting. Right? I’m really here to rubber stamp or to make myself feel great about my pre-made decision, et cetera, et cetera.
And, you know, I thought you were gonna say something. Because I’ve also heard both, right? The meeting after the meeting, the meeting before the meeting. And I’ve often heard people, I mean, I had people argue with me that there’s nothing wrong with that. Like the preparatory meeting is preparatory, and that’s people doing their homework, and the post-meeting is whatever. But yes. And my answer is yes and no. Right? I get it. I understand it. Again, I’m never saying this is immoral or any, but I’m saying that we’re so used to, we’re like the fish swimming around in water. We don’t see the water. We’re unaware of water. We’re so used to those kinds of dynamics that we fail to really get an account for how much valuable time they consume. And you know, whether there would be, like, would it be possible to have more radical candor as Kim Scott describes it, or would it be possible to kind of just say it without the tiptoeing and the reading of the room? And you know, I think, by and large, we can have more learning-oriented conversations that are more out in the open that take less preparation and sanitizing.
Greg McKeown:
Less playing of the room and more learning in the room.
Amy Edmondson:
Exactly. I think playing works in the industrial era, right? It’s because so much certainty and continuity that those dynamics didn’t get you in a whole bunch of trouble. But in the knowledge era, in the digital era, we just don’t really have time and capacity for the, for the playing.
Greg McKeown:
It seems to me. And I’m really curious as to your view on this. It seems to me that the primary dysfunction on teams is silence a certain kind of silence. And I’m wondering whether that contradicts what you’re saying, but I don’t think it does. I think it’s just the other side of the coin. Your thoughts.
Amy Edmondson:
That’s, yeah. I mean you, I only gave you one symptom or observation. Yes, that’s right. Another would be silence, especially silenced by people who could reasonably be called subject matter experts. And have case study, a case study of this, you know, where there’s someone in the room who, or in the zoom, if you will, who has the, now when they’re a hundred percent sure that what they have to say is true and valuable, they’ll say it. But very few of us have a hundred percent certainty about anything in our uncertainty
Greg McKeown:
Companies, especially if we have expertise.
Amy Edmondson:
Right. The more expertise you have, the more sophisticated you’re thinking, the more you know you don’t know. Right? So the silence of experts or non-experts alike is another very, in fact, that’s the one I’m most interested in. Another powerful signal of non-learning.
Greg McKeown:
Can we talk more about that? You said that there were case study after case study. Can you talk about one case study?
Amy Edmondson:
Yes. The one that comes to mind most quickly, and I realize it’s getting old, but it’s still powerful, is the NASA Columbia shuttle combustion upon reentry on February 1st, 2003. This is a 16-day shuttle mission where let’s back up the 16 days at the launch. There had been a rather unfortunate shedding of foam of the solid rocket booster that, unfortunately, we found out later. Did, in fact, a chunk, a giant chunk of insulating foam, hit the leading edge of the shuttle. Made a hole, that hole, which was undetected, the shuttle reentered. And the worst possible thing happened, which was the combustion and death of everybody. So in the d in a mission management team meeting on the eighth day of the 16-day mission, and in the eight days leading up to that, there was an engineer named Rodney Rocha, and there were several of his colleagues who were worried that the about this possibility.
But, I want to emphasize it was utterly ambiguous. In fact, more than ambiguous, it was utterly unclear. But there was a grain video, and there was like a speck that you and I might think of as a sort of dust speck in the video that just Rodney’s gut said that could be something. And so he asked for permission to kind of look into it. Now, I don’t wanna take up your valuable time with too much detail, but he was a little bit stymied in his quest for resources and the, and the kinds of data he thought, well the the obvious data he wanted was to give a phone call to the Department of Defense and get imagery, you know, get, get photos of the shuttle and then you’d know Yes, no, right. It wouldn’t be a wouldn’t be a guessing game anymore.
Anyway. He’s not, they kind of, they’re, and the re they don’t dismiss him because they’re bad people. They’re good people who say. This is our 126 shuttle. We have little foam issues all the time. They’re never catastrophic. And that is true, they never had been before.
So, but now we get to day eight. So here’s the, here’s the story I wanna tell you, which is there’s a mission management team meeting. Rodney’s not on the mission management team, but he’s in the periphery. He’s present around in the room, but again, lower status, if you will. And the AMT talks about this issue for about two minutes, and they dismiss it as a nothing, as a non-issue in that moment. And he’s quite aware, it’s not like, I mean, there are moments where we’re silent, but we’re not kind of holding back. We’re just silent. That’s okay. But in that moment, he sort of like, you know, he almost wants to say, I, I wouldn’t dismiss it so quickly.
You know, he wants to say something, he wants to do something, but he cannot, and why can’t he? Because he sees later says, cuz she meaning the mission management team leaders way up here, I’m way down here, gesturing with his hands about hierarchy.
And so, you know, that’s a kind of particularly dramatic moment. And I have many, many others. But that’s one where someone is haunted later by the idea that they could have spoken up and changed history. Right. And by the way, it’s not like if he had spoken up and they had gotten the imagery, they would’ve seen that there was a, you know, a failure waiting to happen, and it would not have been easy to prevent it, but it would’ve been at least worth trying. And there were a couple of; there were a couple of scenarios that might have worked.
Greg McKeown:
But the distinctive point you are making about that moment is that he felt he should speak up. So it’s not just silent people. Yeah. Out of people or hierarchy.
Amy Edmondson:
Exactly. So I’ve asked people around the world in different organizations, you know, think of a time when you had something, you start with relevant, you know, question, concern, mistake, dissenting view. You know, you, I don’t care, I don’t need a judge to tell us whether it’s true or not. But you believed it was relevant and, and, and you held back, right? I have very rarely, occasionally, but very rarely, had someone not be able to think of something. Right. And then, so there, you know, maybe, maybe if we have time, you know, we talk to our friends, we do a breakout, whatever, forget that.
Now I ask what were, and again it’s just your subjective view, but what were the consequences of your holding back? And there I get this lovely dataset that very rarely varies much in magnitude. There is usually somewhere between three and 7% of like people really believe something consequential, you know, some consequential failure, particularly safety.
I do a lot in healthcare. Safety incidents happened that didn’t have to happen, and they feel terrible. Right? That’s a small, small slice, a big slice. Like a third of them are, you know, we wasted time and resources, you know, that we could, I could have short-circuited, right? Like we took too long to get to the right decision or the too many side meetings or what have you. Because I didn’t, you know, maybe 20, 25% are we actually made a really bad decision. You know, we launched a product we shouldn’t have, you know, maybe you could probably think of your favorite candidates for that, and then a third or so say, yeah, I can’t point to anything, you know, material, but I felt like a wimp. I felt bad about myself. Right. And that, I think that’s material in my own view because that leads to disengagement, and I think we all want to feel we matter, and we don’t wanna deprive people of that feeling.
Greg McKeown:
Well, it’s a non-trivial thing, I think, for at least one reason. Because arguably, our deepest need is to be heard, to be understood. To be seen. And as you say to matter. And so if you have a third of the people saying, when I didn’t do it, I’m choosing not to do it. Even though there are barriers that make it harder to do it, but I didn’t do it when I could have done it, and I felt a certain violation of conscience. Something like that.
Amy Edmondson:
Right. It’s almost like it’s not who I am, and yet it is. Right? It’s, it’s sort of, it’s not how I want to think of myself. I wanna think of myself as someone who isn’t, you know, tiptoeing around because of their bosses in the room or what have you. I don’t want to over and further thinking, but I think it is, I mean, you and I are agreeing on this, that there’s something important about that even though it’s sort of ephemeral,
Greg McKeown:
It may not be as tangible of a business outcome, but it still clearly speaks to the culture, and it clearly speaks to the wholeness of the people in the room. They’re not speaking up when they could on something that mattered to them. Yeah. And something is lost as a result.
Amy Edmondson:
Right. And again, I think it’s probably the case that people who don’t are less likely to do that when they have high levels of certainty that the thing is relevant or will win them approval. Right? No problem. It’s more when they’re not sure. And from my lay observation here, I think there’s more and more opportunities for us to be not sure about things because, you know, there’s so much uncertainty.
Greg McKeown:
So what we’ve covered so far seems to be a definition of psychological safety plus some of the barriers for that psychological safety. Are there other barriers to psychological safety that you think, well, if we don’t talk about this, we haven’t really even covered what the barriers are? Or do we move on to this in some other way?
Amy Edmondson:
You know, I, I think the barriers are pretty well understood by people. I mean, there’s that, you know, hierarchy is a barrier, but it’s not an absolute barrier. Right? We can have hierarchies. It’s really about how people at the higher parts of hierarchies respond and how to convey the nature of the work we do. Whether they seem to be genuinely inviting the quiet voices into the mix or not. So it’s so hierarchy’s a risk factor, but not a determinant. It’s not a bad thing in its own right. It’s, it’s just how, how you handle it.
Greg McKeown:
Well, hierarchy, to some extent, is a necessity. You know, if you have competence, you have a hierarchy. But you’re saying we have to overcome that.
Amy Edmondson:
We have to overcome it because of what’s at stake. Right. Again, not, not from a moralistic perspective, but from a practical perspective. We have to be aware that it can get in the way. And, so we sort of go, okay, let’s figure, let’s figure out how to mitigate the risks.
Greg McKeown:
But you said something interesting just then, and I want you to, just to punctuate it, you said because of what’s at stake. Can you just put, in your own words, maybe it’s a summary of what we’ve said, or it’s a different thought? What is at stake here?
Amy Edmondson:
I mean, what’s at stake for you or for me may differ. I mean, you know, random people in random workplaces. Yes. But by and large, the categories of what’s at stake for me are breakdowns, failures that could be prevented, oftentimes relating to human safety and life.
Let’s say you’re just taking care of patients in a hospital. What’s at stake, of course, is the safe, high-quality care is of the patient is the outcomes. The other category of what’s at stake are often is more of the opportunities that were missed. Now there’s an asymmetry here because, you know, if we fail to speak up or fail to have a high-quality learning conversation and something bad happens that we can then readily recognize was preventable, we learn about it, we feel bad about it, we see it, we try to do better next time.
The tricky part about the opportunity bucket is that we will quite often be unaware of what we lost. Innovation opportunities, what we missed that we missed. Right? They’re, they’re invisible. So what’s at stake is, you know, maybe it’s not today, someone’s gonna get hurt today. But what’s at stake when innovation suffers because of these dynamics is that the future viability of your organization is lowered
Greg McKeown:
In a sense. It’s a bit dramatic way of saying it, but there’s, it’s like an ethical crime because you are not tapping into the potential that could benefit you, your team, the organization, and people in broader society. Cause we’re not talking about the real issues.
Amy Edmondson:
Right. I like that. I like how you put that because it’s sort of, you know, we’ve gotten, we got our educations, we’re given our jobs. We’re, you know, we have all of this investment in us to be in any particular role, in any particular work environment. And it is a little bit of an ethical crime when we don’t use it, and not because, again, it’s not about bad intentions or moral weakness, but just a failure to recognize that you are here for a reason. You have a responsibility to the team, and to the future.
Greg McKeown:
I love the idea that you have a responsibility to the future. I was having a conversation just today with a professor at Cambridge University in England, and we were talking about part of the research that I’m doing right now, which is about helping people and teams get to the heart of the issue fast. And how vitally important, at least that seems to me because, from an equation point of view, you can say, if you have all of the assets of an intelligent person, capable, talented people on a team, you can have driven, engaged people. I mean, you can have lots of terrific assets, but if you multiply it by zero, it’s still a zero. And that zero, you know, to me at least seems to be, if you don’t address the right issue, if you’re trying to solve the wrong problem, then nothing else matters. All the rest can be fully engaged. But if it’s not going in the, you know, on the part of the right problem, it all gets neutralized.
I wonder how you see both your work in psychological safety, but also, of course, beyond that, all of this rich research that you’ve done for all of these years at HBS. Do you see a relationship between not getting to the heart of the issue and psychological safety?
Amy Edmondson:
Absolutely. And I just, I, I mean I, I love how you just put that in the multiply by zero point is so powerful in my field of, let’s say I’m inter, I’m a team scholar, let’s say I’m interested in teams and teamwork, the historic work kind of up until my era, I suppose led by Richard Hackman and Joe McGrath and others was get the structures right, get the inputs right. Like, we can’t force teamwork or engineer teamwork, but if you get the right skill set, you know, kind of a reasonably good set of resources, maybe a good team leader, whatever, then your chances of teamwork are higher. Which, I couldn’t agree more.
But the tragedy, I guess crime, yes, maybe that I see is too often you’ve gotten those smart people together, right? You’ve got great resources, and you’re multiplying by zero. You know, and why are you multiplying by zero? Because you’re not actually leveraging, it’s sort of like, here are the inputs, but then here’s the process or the norms or the mindsets that you need to convert those inputs into outputs. And I think we often think because of maybe industrial era logic that gets the inputs, will get the outputs doesn’t work that way. Right? So yes, I think that’s a very good way to put it. Like there’s all of this lost potential, you know, when we don’t have a way of finding the synergy that we could find if we were more candid, honest, less defensive, less holding back.
Greg McKeown:
Okay. Does the research show that over the last 20ish years, people feel more psychologically safe at work the same or less?
Amy Edmondson:
Honestly, we don’t know, but there’s a lot of things we do know. There’s a problem with that question. Not the question’s a good question, but the problem with trying to answer
Greg McKeown:
The question, trying to answer it, yes, I understand.
Amy Edmondson:
Over the last, let’s say, seven years, particularly since Google got a lot of attention for discovering this, yes, very powerful result. The definitions or conceptualizations of psychological safety have multiplied, and people have expanded the domain of psychological safety to include everything from job security to safe space. I am guaranteed that nothing you say will hurt my feelings in any way in this space. You know, trigger-free, if you will, to yes. Comfortable, you know, laid back. And, of course, it’s partly my fault because the term, which I didn’t coin, by the way, but it was in the literature, it just wasn’t, hadn’t gotten a lot of attention. And maybe because of this connection to learning, which so interested me. So if people have a fuzzy notion of what it is, then it’s hard to sort of say, is it going up or down? But if I were to say scientifically, I think my best guess is up, right? Compared to when I was a young person starting out in the corporate world, there’s more candor, more directness, and less sort of formality. I mean, I remember doing work at Sears when people were calling each other Mr. That just doesn’t happen today.
Greg McKeown:
You are saying that there has been, in your observation, an improvement in the informality of conversations, allowing, at least in theory, people who are more junior to feel more equal, to be able to speak up more because there isn’t such a reinforced set of rituals reminding you that, you know, know your place. You are not the one to have the opinion, to have a point of view right now.
Amy Edmondson:
Yes. And, in fact, I love that word ritual, right? Because that is in, indeed, another one of those sort of non-learning signs or signals in, in teams when they’re, when you notice that they’re doing this dance now and now they’re doing that dance, right? Whether it’s, you know, there are rituals of reassurance that you can observe, right? Where it’s like, we’re right about this, right? Yep. We’re right about this.
And so you’re absolutely right to point out that there isn’t a hundred percent relationship between formality and candor. Not at all. I mean, you can see high candor in a military setting, for example. It’s well, well-led, but by and large, just human behavior; more formality can be at least a risk factor, right? It sort of implies a certain, get your ducks in a row before you open your mouth.
And, politeness, by the way, the whole essence of politeness, the people who studied that for a living, what it’s about is face-saving, right? It’s, you know, I’ll come to you because you’re superior to me, so I come to you with a sort of indirect, maybe have you thought about it this way? When I really want to say, “That won’t work.” But because you’re senior to me, I ease in. And it’s all about face-saving. Well, face-saving is anathema to learning.
Greg McKeown:
What’s one idea in today’s conversation that stood out to you? What is one thing you can do differently to increase the psychological safety for you and the people around you? Who is one person that you can have this conversation with so that you can be able to produce more psychological safety in others?
If you haven’t already done it, sign up for my newsletter, The One Minute Wednesday comes out, of course, every Wednesday, it takes just a minute to read, but it can help you to reinforce these ideas, help them to go deeper and keep you on track so that you can make a higher contribution.
For the first five people who write a review of this episode on Apple Podcasts, you’ll receive free access to the Essentialism Academy. Just go to gregmckeown.com/podcastpromo. Thank you. Really, thank you for listening, and I’ll see you next time.
